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Any discussion of valuation must start with the definitions to be
used. In the case of Internal Revenue Service valuation, the estate and
gift tax statute furnishes no definition, simply using the word "value."
The regulations, however, supply the missing elements-section
20.2031-1(b)' provides that the value to be used is "fair market
value," which is defined as "the price at which the property will change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being
under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts."
Fair market value does not mean the value in a "fair market"
but instead the fair value of the particular property in the then existing
market. At times it has been argued that where the market for a
particular property was distorted by external conditions, the resulting
value was an improper measure. This position has been generally
rejected, however.
The term "willing buyer and willing seller" is of course unambigu-
ous, but the re-creation of these two fictional characters is very diffi-
cult. Typically, the taxpayer assumes the role of the willing seller,
while the government agent is much more impressed by the probable
willingness of the buyer.
Similarly, the lack of compulsion upon the parties is unambiguous,
and ordinarily it poses little difficulty in interpretation. It of course
bars forced sales as any criterion of the value of the property sold,
and in appropriate cases would rule out other sales made under forced
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conditions, whether affecting either the buyer or the seller. An ap-
parent exception to the rule is where liquidation of property has been
commenced prior to the critical date. In such a case the realized value
would appear to be fair market value of the particular property re-
gardless of obvious compulsion to complete the liquidation.
The final element in the definition relates to knowledge of the
facts in the case. Note that this is limited to a "reasonable" knowledge
of "relevant" facts. In effect this is a restatement of the rule as to fair
value in the existing market, since not infrequently there may be un-
known facts having substantial effect upon ultimate value. In the
Wright Estate case' certain damaging facts about a stock were un-
known at the date of death and became known thereafter. The exe-
cutor urged that the market value should be reduced by the impact
of the subsequent knowledge. The court disagreed upon the ground
that such knowledge could not reasonably be imputed to anyone and
that the market as it then existed measured the value as of the date
of death.
Once the matter of definitions is settled, the question arises as to
what evidence of value will be acceptable. The evidence carrying
the greatest weight is the sale of identical or comparable property in
an arms-length transaction at a time reasonably close to the valuation
date. But what are comparable properties? What makes a transaction
one at arms-length? What length of time is unreasonable? All of
these are matters of judgment, and here, as in the "willing buyer and
willing seller" area, the Internal Revenue Service is likely to be much
more critical than the taxpayer. By that I mean that it will set much
higher standards of comparison, and will question closely the relation-
ship of the parties, whether personal, financial or social. It will doubt
whether too long a period did not elapse to permit a valid comparison.
On the other hand, the taxpayer will take the same dim view of a sale
of comparable property which seems to him to have been unreasonably
high, and in the recent era of rising prices, such instances have not
been uncommon.
Despite this understandable difference in attitude, however, the
existence of reasonably comparable sales is usually a quite persuasive
factor in valuation.
Lacking such sales, it is obvious that opinion evidence must be
called upon, and here the question becomes one of the credibility both
of the witness and of his basis for opinion. The expert knowledge of
the witness is of particularly great importance in the valuation of real
estate and tangible personal property, although the background for
2 43 B.TNA. 551 (1941).
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the opinion may also be thoroughly explored in the case of large items
or when some doubt as to credibility exists in the mind of the examin-
ing agent or his superior.
In the valuation of intangibles, by contrast, the background of
the opinion is ordinarily much more important than the knowledge of
the witness himself. Whoever he is, he must be prepared to defend his
position by the use of all the weapons of a financial analyst. If he
looks at sales of similar property (as contrasted with comparable
property) the degree of similarity must be established solidly. If he
uses income as a basis for his opinion, he needs to justify his capitaliza-
tion rates and any estimate of future income as differing from the past.
Ordinarily, real estate values and the values of tangible personal
property can be worked out with relative ease. With respect to both
of these, the government is usually at an initial disadvantage in that
the agent auditing the return seldom has the services of an expert to
call upon. This is not true in very large cases where the Engineering
Division of the Service may be called upon to provide such advice.
This is a most unusual situation, however, and in the ordinary case
a revenue agent must pick up his information as best he can.
With rare exception, an examining agent makes a serious attempt
to establish fair valuations for these types of property. In most cases
he acquires a stable of more or less expert real estate appraisers who
are good natured enough to give him free valuation advice. He tries
to average out the result of two or three such opinions, realizing that
these people never have an opportunity to make a detailed examination
of the property and often make their appraisal from simple memory
of a neighborhood. Surprisingly enough, however, a good many will
actually go to look at property at their own expense.
In the event that the agent runs into a great deal of opposition
with respect to the valuation of a particular property, he will usually
go back to his appraisers and query whether they have taken into ac-
count circumstances and defects pointed out by the taxpayer's repre-
sentatives. As a result, litigation of the values of this type of property
is relatively unusual.
Not so, however, with the valuation of intangibles. As a matter
of fact, the valuation of business interests, especially close corporation
stocks, is the area of greatest uncertainty in estate and gift tax, in
the absence of an effective buy-sell arrangement. It is here that valua-
tion is most an art and least a science. Here, too, the Internal Revenue
Service takes heart from the statement of the court in Wishon v. Anglim3
that the Commissioner has the first guess at value and will ordinarily
prevail. It is significant that while the regulations themselves are still
3 42 F. Supp. 359, 42-1 U.S.T.C. f[ 10,123 (N.D. Calif. 1941).
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most sketchy in the treatment of the valuation of business interests,
the Service has issued two comprehensive revenue rulings on the sub-
ject, the last and by far the most sophisticated being Revenue Ruling
59-60.4 This ruling will be discussed in detail later.
Traditionally, the Service has followed general principles of eval-
uation of intangible property. One of the most interesting of the early
decisions was that of James Couzens.5 In the opinion in this case,
Judge VanFossan determined the value of Ford Motor Company
stock, and did a masterly job of outlining the various considerations
underlying such evaluation. I recommend the opinion both for its
technical quality and the interesting factual situation involved.
Generally speaking, there are three principal approaches to the
valuation of a business. These are asset value, earnings value and
dividend value. These in turn are subdivided into various groupings
of fact and speculation, and usually a combination of these are con-
sidered together by the appraiser in arriving at a final valuation.
The published position of the Service throughout its history has
been that all relevant factors must be considered in valuation of this
sort of property. For many years this was practically the only state-
ment in the regulations, except in connection with listed or over-the-
counter securities. And in the revenue rulings referred to, this flexi-
bility was in essence retained, especially in Revenue Ruling 59-60.
In practice, the Service in earlier days tended to use fairly stereo-
typed formulae in approaching the valuation of business interests.
Despite the breadth and clarity of the Couzens decision,6 many estate
tax agents remained blissfully unaware of its principles since it in-
volved income tax and was thus foreign to their experience.
This practice, of course, was a matter of wide variation. In the
more sophisticated financial centers of the east, revenue agents were
correspondingly better equipped to deal with valuation problems. They
had the further advantage of often dealing with cases of sufficient size
to warrant calling upon business experts to evaluate the properties
involved. By and large, however, the representatives of the Service
tended to adopt formulae which were applied indiscriminately to valua-
tion of businesses and resulted in an unjustifiable rigidity of evaluation
unduly favorable to some taxpayers, unduly harsh as to others.
There was over-all progress, however. For many years during
the initial period of estate tax administration, for example, book value
or asset value was considered as of primary importance, despite the
fact that even if it were accurate, ordinarily it was unavailable to the
4 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 237.
5 11 B.TA. 1040 (1928).
6 Supra note 5.
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owner of a share in a business. Gradually, it was recognized that this
was a factor which affected only the rate of capitalization properly
attributable to earnings capacity, except in those unusual cases in
which liquidating control rested in the interest to be evaluated. At
about the same time a combination earnings-book value formula, de-
vised for use in income tax cases, was adapted to and widely applied
in estate and gift tax cases. This is the familiar "A.R.M. 342"7
While in many situations the formula had substantial merit, the
capitalization rates originally suggested were often inflexibly applied
and the results were far from happy. It did, however, point up the
importance of intangible value, or earnings value, as compared with
asset value, and focus attention upon what has come to be called
"good will."
As used by the Internal Revenue Service, good will is not merely
the traditional legal term identifying the chance that the public will
continue to patronize a particular business. Instead it is a blanket
term which covers all kinds of intangible values. Thus any special
competitive advantage, such as patents or secret processes, will con-
tribute to good will. Franchises or chain names, methods of operation
and so on, efficient management, exceptional technical knowledge-
all of these are a part of what the Internal Revenue Service regards as
the "good will" of a particular enterprise.
And as the extent of the definition broadened, so too did the
flexibility of the Service in dealing with these elements. The traditional
fifteen per cent capitalization for intangibles under "A.R.M. 34" was
streched out as high as twenty-five per cent, the yield on tangibles
went from eight to ten per cent. In fact, in one unusual case, where
the agent was called upon to value a gambling operation he used a
fifty per cent capitalization rate of the intangible earnings. The reason-
the owner was the estate of the brother of the mayor of the city; the
mayor had a further period of two years in office; the probabilities
were that he would not be re-elected.
Along with this increased attention to intangible elements of
value came an additional awareness of discount factors as well. The
incapacity of management, the lack of any successor to the deceased
executive, a probability of a continuing decline in market or the
threat of new competition, all of these were in appropriate cases
urged upon and recognized by internal revenue agents. The entire
valuation process in the Service thus continued in a state of progress.
All of this change involved a growing recognition of the im-
portance of earnings. In essence, the value of any piece of property
at a given moment is the prospect of advantage which it offers to its
7 2 Cum. Bull. 31 (1920).
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owner in the future. Such prospects of advantage depend primarily
upon the existence of earnings which can be distributed by the business
to the proprietor. A purely historical approach is based upon the
belief that past history will repeat itself in the future, but this belief
must always be modified by the recognition of trends which exist at
any particular time. Earnings are not a static thing except in the area
of monopolies, but rather depend upon the conditions in the particular
industry or business, upon conditions in the economy as a whole, upon
changing geographical considerations and many other factors. With
increasing emphasis upon earnings, all of these factors were accorded
more and more consideration. And all of these are reflected in Revenue
Ruling 59-60 as factors which must be considered by the internal
revenue personnel evaluating this type of property.
One thing which has been overlooked, or at least minimized
throughout the Service's developing valuation policy, has been the final
fact that earnings must be available to the business owner and that
unless the interest which is being valued has control sufficient to ap-
propriate the earnings, dividends or yield is the most important single
factor to be considered.
The classic example of this is, of course, the minority holding of
stock in a close corporation. There is absolutely no control over
dividend policy in such a case, and unless some unreasonable circum-
stances exist, such as a large accumulation of surplus without any
business purpose, or some evidence of mismanagement, the holder of
this stock is at the mercy of the controlling shareholders as to any
realized or realizable yield. Obviously this limits the market value
of such a holding drastically, yet the Service has never published any
recognition of this fact, and revenue agents are very chary of giving
much weight to it as a result. It apparently has not been urged in liti-
gation by taxpayers, the only case in which the importance of the
minority nature of the holding is stressed being Mathilde B. Hooper,8
although some other cases do mention it as a factor to be considered.
Interests in publicly-held corporations have likewise benefited
from a change in valuation concepts over the years. The Service's
original position was that the published market price as of the date of
death or gift governed value, and it bitterly fought all attempts to
inject a discount factor based upon the size of the block held. It
received no support from the courts, however, who recognized that
a thin market and a substantial block of sock in many cases meant
that the market price was wholly unrealizable as a fact.
Taxpayer's counsel attempted in several cases to generalize this
8 41 B.T.A. 114 (1940).
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"blockage" principle as a rule of law applicable to all large blocks.
The courts, however, declined to follow this argument and have con-
sistently held that blockage is a question of fact and not of law, and
that the estate or donor has the burden of demonstrating the effect
of blockage upon the fair market value of the particular block of stock
to be valued.
The rule has evolved that fair market value in such a case is the
amount which a skilled broker, selling the block of stock on the best
terms possible and within a reasonable time, could secure from such
a sale. Excellent discussions of the rule may be found in Bull v.
Smith,9 and in Helvering v. Maytag."0 The Service has since reluc-
tantly accepted blockage as a material question of fact.
Probably the most fertile area for valuation disputes involves
the stock of closely-held corporations. In Revenue Ruling 59-60,
previously referred to, a very detailed statement of Service principles
and aims is made. This represents a flexible and reasonably sophisti-
cated approach to this valuation problem, and may well be taken as
a statement of general principles which will be applied to the valua-
tion of all business interests other than those having an established
market. Its only defect lies in the continued refusal to accept the
controlling importance of dividend yield in the case of minority in-
terests, which presumably remains a "Pandora's box" in the eyes of
the Service.
The ruling recognizes and approves the use of comparative values,
another instance of reluctant concession by the Service. Taxpayers
have urged for thirty years that the best yardstick for close corpora-
tion stocks was the price-earnings and other ratios of stocks of com-
parable companies quoted in the market. It took amendment of the
taxing statute to get the Service to recognize any applicability of this
criterion, however, and even then it was emphasized and underscored
that such a comparison was only one of the factors to be considered
in appropriate cases.
The ruling states the current position of the Service, that the
taxpayer must establish valid comparisons, and when that is done, very
great weight will be given to the ratios demonstrated. When this is
taken into account together with the discount factor that courts have
recognized on account of lack of marketability, a broad and relatively
sound basis for valuation is made available to the estate planner and
administrator.
The ruling also covers valuation based upon assets of the corpora-
tion, either as shown on the balance sheet or as modified to reflect cur-
9 119 F.2d 490, 27 Am. Fed. Tax R. 151, 41-1 U.S.T.C. ff 10,049 (2d Cir. 1941).
10 125 F.2d 55; 42-1 S.T.C. ff 10,129 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 689 (1942).
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rent market values. This approach is discussed solely as a contributing
factor, and not as one of controlling importance. The value of stock
based upon its dividend yield is likewise mentioned, but again only as
a contributing factor. And except in the case of a minority holding,
this approach is clearly correct.
The principal discussion centers about the determination of value
based upon earnings, or "dividend-paying capacity." Here a most
helpful list of elements which should be considered in arriving at
value is given by the Service, and it should be studied in detail by
anyone having the question of valuation of business interests.
The ruling also covers a number of special cases, the most im-
portant being the existence of a buy-sell agreement. Over the past
fifteen years the importance of such agreements has grown immensely,
in spite of a number of attacks by the Service upon income tax as-
pects of the matter. These attacks are not ended, the most serious
ones presently confronting the taxpayer being the possibility of un-
reasonable accumulation of surplus so far as corporate income taxes
are concerned, and the possible attribution of stock in family-held
corporations as to personal income tax effects. Despite these factors,
thousands of buy-sell agreements are in existence today and if they
comply with the judicial rules of being actual and not sham, and of
binding the parties from the date of execution of the agreement rather
than merely upon death, the value they fix will be binding upon the
taxing authorities for estate tax purposes.
Holding company values are likewise discussed in the ruling, and
these have provided a number of valuation cases in the past. The
question ordinarily involved is that of discounting the value of the
underlying assets to reflect lack of liquidating control, taxable capital
gains upon disposition by the holding company and so on. In general,
such a discount factor has been recognized in the absence of liquidat-
ing control; for examples, see Laird v. Comm'r," Smith Estate,2 and
Garrett Estate.'3
It may be noted that some relief may be found in this situation
by the use of comparatives. There are a number of closed-end invest-
ment trusts which are sold over the counter at very substantial dis-
counts from underlying asset value. On the other hand, other trusts
of this type sell either at asset value or even a slight premium. The
selection of true comparatives in this field is unusually difficult.
As I said a moment ago, the general principles of Revenue Ruling
59-60 are applicable to most business interests. There are, of course,
11 85 F.2d 598, 18 Am. Fed Tax R. 470, 36-2 U.S.T.C. f1 9455 (3d Cir., 1936).
12 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 907, 19 P.H Tax Ct. Mem. 819 (1950).
13 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1142, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1026 (1953).
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special factors in the case of non-corporate holdings. Thus, in partner-
ship valuations, there must be considered the effect of the state law as
to disposition of assets in the absence of special agreement. Also there
is always a question of the effect of the partnership agreement, which
often is in substance a buy-sell arrangement between the partners.
The question of good-will values in partnerships has likewise
caused substantial litigation, an early case having held that there was
no such thing.14 Later cases have generally applied the ordinary rules
for valuation of intangible yield, however.
One question peculiar to non-corporate businesses is the matter
of taxes. In valuing corporation stock on the basis of earn-
ings, corporate taxes are subtracted from net earnings in order to
arrive at the number of dollars available to the owners. In partner-
ships these earnings are taxed only in the hands of the owners them-
selves. There has been a great deal of dispute as to what allowances
should be made for this tax burden in evaluating the worth of a part-
nership interest or a sole proprietorship.
While there is no announced Service policy in connection with
this valuation problem, a taxpayer might well treat partnership income
as equivalent to corporation income and apply corporate tax rates to
determine the after-tax dollars available. Validity of this approach
may be questioned, but a good many revenue agents will give it weight
as bringing the valuation procedure in such a case into line with the
accepted rules on corporation stock values.
This has necessarily been an incomplete and sketchy presentation
of an important problem confronting estate planners and administra-
tors alike. I hope it has been of some assistance in pulling together
the elementary considerations presently valid in the field.
14 Kaffie Estate, 44 B.TA.. 843 (1941).
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